6 April 2003
by David R. Wells and
Lawrence H. Wells
6 April 2003
As we said in our January 2003 message, we believe there is a case for forcing Saddam Hussein from power. There is no question in our minds that Saddam Hussein is indeed a dangerous, even evil person. He cruelly represses his own people, has invaded neighboring countries, and has used chemical weapons. He has consistently tried (often with considerable success) to circumvent U.N. resolutions meant to eliminate his chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs. He at least tolerates an al Qaeda presence in Iraq, and he has actively supported other terrorist organizations.
In January our question was whether Saddam Hussein was an immediate threat to the United States, or to put it constitutionally, a "clear and present danger". President Bush has evidently decided that the answer is yes.
We still must ask one hard question: Is he right? We think that the final answer won't be known until after the fighting is over. Only then will we find out if Saddam Hussein was hiding nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, ballistic missiles, or terrorist bases. Our suspicion is that he been hiding chemical and biological weapons.
We doubt that Iraq has ballistic missiles with enough range to hit the United States, although it may still have banned intermediate range ballistic missiles. There were reports that Iraq fired a few "Scud" missiles (which Iraq is forbidden to possess) at Kuwait early in the war, but we do not know if these reports were accurate.
If American forces find evidence of any or all of these weapons, then the war will be justified. If no such weapons are found there will be a strong case for regime change in Washington in November 2004.
We were not completely convinced of a strong link between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda. Now that the headquarters of Ansar al Islam (the organization that President Bush has claimed is the link between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda) has been captured perhaps proof will be forthcoming.
The original goal in Iraq was to disarm Saddam Hussein. With the failure of diplomacy the goal has changed: It is now not merely to disarm Saddam Hussein, but to remove him from power and rebuild Iraq as a functioning democracy. This is a worthwhile goal, but it will definitely not be easy to achieve. This war most likely will not be as short as the 1991 Persian Gulf War, which lasted 6 weeks. The nation building phase will likely last years.
Nevertheless, we believe that the United States should do the difficult work required to make Iraq a true functioning democracy. The problems are indeed large: broken infrastructure, potential religious and ethnic strife, a residual political culture that is the equivalent of a toxic waste dump, the desire for revenge on the part of many, a fractious exile community, and general postwar chaos. There is no widely respected figure outside government, like Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan, who would be an obvious benevolent leader. On the other hand, Iraq has some advantages: plentiful water, potential oil wealth, a relatively sophisticated, educated population, and at least some modern infrastructure. There will probably have to be an occupation government for at least a short time, if only to impose order. Power should be transferred to a new Iraqi civilian administration as soon as possible, with elections to follow as soon as practical. As we have stated, this will not be easy. The United States must be both patient and generous, lest another dictator arise.
In order to achieve this goal we must remove Hussein's regime in a manner that minimizes both civilian casualties and damage to Iraq's infrastructure. We can't destroy Iraq in order to "save" it. This is reflected in the tactics used by the U.S. led coalition. While we're certain Coalition forces are doing everything possible to prevent civilian casualties, we have no doubt that some Iraqi civilians will be killed by our attack. Even the smartest bombs and missiles occasionally miss their targets, and in a densely populated urban area like Baghdad even one miss can have disasterous consequences.
The tactics employed by the Iraqi regime stand in sharp contrast to those employed by the Coalition. In September 2001 we wrote: "We face a ruthless adversary with little regard for human life. While we do everything possible to minimize civilian deaths, he will seek to maximize them. At some point our adversary will probably even stoop to using innocent bystanders as human shields." We were writing about al Qaeda, but the same obviously applies to Saddam Hussein's forces. We've seen several news reports of Iraqi paramilitaries using Iraqi civilians as human shields. In another widely publicized incident, Iraqi paramilitaries in Basra opened fire on Iraqi civilians who were attempting to flee the city. Fortunately the intervention of British troops prevented a massacre.
We must admit that the tactics and timing of the start of the war surprised us; we expected air strikes to begin about a week later than they actually did, followed by ground troops some time after 1 April. Because the U.S. enjoys an enormous superiority in night combat, it seemed reasonable to wait for the moon to wane in order to maximize this advantage. We thought the ground campaign would be delayed until the forces still in transit had arrived. We also thought there might be a political advantage in giving diplomacy another week or two to work.
As we predicted the Iraqi air force didn't put up a fight.
As we predicted the Iraqi regular army didn't put up much of a fight, though in some areas it did fight better than expected.
As we predicted, the Republican Guard has put up a better fight than any other Iraqi military force. When engaged outside cities, so far, they have been handily defeated, just as they were in 1991. We give Coalition generals credit for defeating many Republican Guard units outside cities, and avoiding urban warfare.
We completely missed the possibility of irregular forces, such as the Fedayeen Saddam, fighting a rear guard action. We take some small level of comfort in the knowledge that everyone else missed it too.
The cruise missile strike that began the war was evidently targeted directly at Saddam Hussein and other top Iraqi leaders. That this could be done suggests major improvements in intelligence, command, and control since the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf war. In that war it typically took about two days to plan a strike after a strategic target was identified; this time it took only a few hours. While the strike apparently did not succeed in killing Saddam Hussein, it was certainly worth trying. Had it succeeded, the rest of the war might have become unnecessary.
The "shock and awe" hype that preceded the war now appears to have been mainly psychological warfare intended to persuade the Iraqi army not to fight. Once again while this psychological warfare was largely unsuccessful it was certainly worth trying.
This once again shows the strengths and limitations of air power. Once again strategic air power alone was unable to win a war, and once again tactical air power is proving to be decisive. We fear that the US Air Force will once again draw the opposite conclusion.
Strategic Airpower Theory dates back at least to 1921, when Italian General Giulio Douhet wrote that the way to win wars was to bomb the enemy's capital into submission from the air, making ground forces largely unnecessary. Over the decades, this theory has failed on almost every occasion, but it is still widely believed.
We tend to believe that airpower should be used more tactically, and cooperate with ground and naval forces. This method has also been used in Iraq, and has been far more successful.
While the Department of Defense told us this would be a war like no other, from the U.S. side this is starting to look very much like any other war. That said the war plan so far has some unorthodox elements. The Coalition ground forces we've seen so far have advanced rapidly along a fairly narrow front, and have mostly bypassed cities and larger towns in their path rather than securing them in a conventional manner. On the one hand this approach has kept us out of the sort of urban warfare that might give the Iraqi army an advantage, but on the other hand it has left us with long supply lines that are vulnerable to nuisance raids.
With appropriate care, this strategy could work. An interesting comparison is the "Island Hopping" campaign of World War II. Back then, American forces realized that they didn't need to take every Japanese held island. Many could be bypassed.
US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has now been getting criticism in the media recently for not sending enough troops, but we think that this only tells part of the story.
You may have heard the old joke that a camel is a horse designed by a committee. We think that this is the origin of some of the tactical problems we're having in Iraq. Rumsfeld originally wanted a lightweight campaign emphasizing special forces and air power, in other words, a campaign like Afghanistan. The Army wanted to go in with a large, heavy invasion force. They compromised, and got a force with the disadvantages of both with the advantages of neither.
In some ways, this is slightly unfair to Mr. Rumsfeld. The original plan called for the 4th Armored Division to deploy to the Kurdish regions of Iraq via Turkey. The Turks decided not to allow this. The 4th Armored Division had to redeploy its equipment to Kuwait, and is only now becoming available.
In this war it is best to expect the unexpected. Most media analysts suggest that the U.S. forces advancing from the south and east will launch "hit and run" attacks against the Iraqi Republican Guard units and other forces that are defending Baghdad. This would be similar to the tactics the British are employing in Basra. While is likely to happen, we would not be surprised to see the defenders struck from an entirely different direction. Early in the war it was reported that U.S. forces had captured two airfields in western Iraq, and we've heard almost nothing about them since. We wonder if these airfields are being used to position a large Coalition force that could attack Baghdad from the west while the Republican Guards are confronting the forces that are advancing from the south and east.
So how did we end up in this war? As usual there is plenty of blame to go around:
Saddam Hussein. Had he lived up to the disarmament commitments he made after the 1991 Persian Gulf War, this war would have been unnecessary. Instead he spent the last twelve years trying to circumvent the disarmament process, often with considerable success.
We have no sympathy at all for Saddam Hussein. We will smile when he's gone. We have lots of sympathy for his victims, most of whom are Iraqis.
George H. W. Bush. He had the opportunity to topple Saddam Hussein in 1991, and he failed to do it. While we agreed on the goal, your humble authors have long had a difference of opinion on how George I should have done this.
Larry's Opinion: Should have Slammed the Door on Basra Those who defend George I's policies usually argue that we had no mandate to send troops to Baghdad. This is argument is a "straw man" – we didn't need to go to Baghdad to depose Saddam Hussein. Had Bush allowed the 1991 war to continue for one additional day, almost the entire Iraqi army would have been trapped to the south of Basra where it could have been captured or destroyed. With the bulk of his army gone, Saddam Hussein would not have been able to suppress the rebellions that broke out immediately after that war.
David's Opinion: Should have Rolled on Baghdad While "slamming the door" on the Republican Guard near Basra would have been a good start, there was no guarantee that it would have been sufficient to topple Saddam Hussein. At the end of the 1991 Gulf War, there were almost no Iraqi forces between Kuwait and Baghdad. American and British forces could have moved on Baghdad almost unopposed. Other coalition members would have been upset, but couldn't have done a thing about it. We could have and should have taken Saddam out then, once and for all. That was my opinion in 1991, and it hasn't changed in the past twelve years.
We both agree that George I's call to the Iraqi people to rise up in revolt and subsequent failure to support them was shameful. This is one major reason that the Iraqi people have not risen up in revolt against Saddam Hussein this time around. Given our history, would you?
We've long suspected that Bush made a conscious decision to leave Hussein in power, fearing that he might otherwise be succeeded by a pro-Iranian regime. As an aside had Saddam Hussein been deposed after the 1991 War, the 11 Sept 2001 attacks might never have happened. The presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia is one of the main reasons Osama bin Laden opposes the USA, and those troops were in Saudi Arabia to "contain" Saddam Hussein.
George W. Bush. As we've noted above, we have suspended some of our judgement on George II's handling of the situation until we find out if there really are chemical and biological weapons in Iraq. We actually do suspect that these weapons are really there. If they're not, we will call for "regime change" in the US in November 2004.
Still, George II gets some negative points for his heavy handed diplomacy with our allies. If he had been a better leader, he might have quietly persuaded more of our allies to help. Instead, we have alienated many of our traditional allies.
The French government. Robust diplomacy backed by a credible threat of military force might have compelled Saddam Hussein to disarm peacefully. French intransigence insured that diplomacy would be weak and therefore doomed to failure. We have no doubt that the French knew their diplomatic approach would not disarm Saddam Hussein, but because of their position as a major supplier of arms to Iraq and their financial interest in Iraqi oil they cynically manipulated the diplomatic process to prevent any action from being taken. This is nothing new; the French government also politically undermined the U.N. weapons inspection program in the mid 1990s.
Dishonorable mention also goes to the Russian and Chinese governments for similar reasons.
We especially criticize President Jacques Chirac and Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin. Chirac lost what credibility he had when he threatened to withhold EU membership from eastern European nations which supported the United States. de Villepin lost his credibility when he "sandbagged" US Secretary of State Colin Powell on 20 January 2003. In one meeting, he turned Powell from an ally into an enemy. From that day on, Powell supported the war unconditionally, and regarded the French government with suspicion.
One topic we're researching now is France's involvement with Iraq's missile program. On 13 March and 20 March, New York Times columnist William Safire (the Times' token right winger) wrote of French sales of rocket fuel to Iraq, as recently as 2002. Now, since Mr. Safire is a conservative, he has a political motivation for criticizing France and supporting George II, but his data is consistent with some of our other sources. More info on this as it becomes available.
Bill Clinton. He neglected the original 1991 Gulf War coalition for his entire two terms in office. He also failed to take significant action in 1998 when Saddam kicked out the weapons inspectors. These two things might seem small, but their effect was enormous.
The Turkish Government. The war might have gone more quickly had the Turkish government allowed the 4th Armored division to move through Turkey to the Kurdish regions of northern Iraq. The 4th Armored division had to wait until its equipment arrived in Kuwait before deploying. While the Turkish people are strongly opposed to the war, it is sometimes necessary for a government to lead rather than follow public opinion.
Links:
UN Resolution 1441 The full text at the US State Department.
The NewsHour on PBS Forget ABC, CBS, CNN, Fox, and NBC; this is the best television news program in the USA.
BBC World Service The BBC is the best news organization in the world.
Canadian Broadcasting Corp, and Radio Canada International are also good non-US news sources.
www.agonist.org A personal web site with news headlines and a forum about the war in Iraq.
www.methaz.com A site with satellite pictures of Iraq
United States Naval Institute Some news about the war in Iraq, and also some technical information.
Globalsecurity.org Technical information about weapons being used in the war.