The Wells Brothers' Wartime Assessment: October 2006

by David R. Wells and Lawrence H. Wells
15 Oct 2006


0: Table of Contents

1: 9/11 Plus 5 Years
2: The War in Iraq
3: Election Year Silliness
4: Other national security problems
5: Links

1: 9/11 Plus 5 Years

It has now been five years since the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. We started writing these messages immediately afterward. It is once again time time to review the war on terror. Unfortunately, our 2006 assessment sounds much like our 2005 assessment.

1.1: War on Terror: Progress (?) Report

The results for the US are a mixed bag. There have been successes and failures.

1.1.1: Successes in the War on Terror

1.1.2: Failures in the War on Terror

1.3 Conclusions

  1. The United States has no choice but to continue the global war on terrorism.

  2. Greater military effort is required. This will require more "boots on the ground" in places like Afghanistan.

  3. The United States must make sure that we are fighting the right battle. The terrorists want this to be a war between Islam and the West. We must not play their game.


2: The War in Iraq

2.1: Still Winning the War, Still Losing the Peace?

We've often said that winning the war was the easy part; the really hard part is winning the peace. Unfortunately this is certainly the case in Iraq. If this sounds like our October 2004 and October 2005 messages, it should. We don't think that the situation has changed as much as it should have.

Our ideals on the Iraq operation haven't changed much. We still support constitutional democracy in Iraq. We still don't advocate a military withdrawal from Iraq. Running away at this point would be disastrous.

Since our last message, Iraq has held elections, and installed a permanent government. Iraqi security forces are growing in numbers and skill, and are taking a larger part in the fighting. While this is good, it is not working nearly as well as we would like.

Much of the blame for the current sorry state of affairs belongs with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Since joining the Bush Administration he has been the leading advocate of "military transformation". While we applaud efforts to think outside the box, Mr. Rumsfeld's version of "military transformation" seems to be little more than "Do more with less resources." This is a frighteningly Clintonian method of military reform.

It still isn't working very well in Iraq.

Several retired high-ranking military officers have recently been speaking out about Mr. Rumsfeld's inept handling of the war in Iraq. The most prominent critics are
Maj. Gen. John R.S. Batiste, Maj.  Gen. Paul Eaton, and Col.Thomas K. Hamnies. All served in Iraq. Many of their criticisms sound distressingly like ours. We must also note that some other retired officers have criticized Batiste, Eaton, and Hamnies by claiming it is inappropriate for retired military officers to publicly criticize the civilian leadership in time of war. We disagree completely. Active duty officers must not publicly criticize the civilian leadership, but we believe retired officers have a duty to speak out if they believe the war effort is being led incompetently. Our only complaint with Batiste, Eaton, and Hamnies is that they have sometimes spoken at political events for the Democratic Party, which gives the appearance of election year partisan sniping. We must note that the Democratic Party does not have a credible plan for success in Iraq, and if they are elected we expect things will get even worse.

2.1.1: A Civil War?

Much time has been spent in recent months debating about whether or not Iraq is involved in a civil war. Indeed, there has been much fighting between Sunnis and Shias since al Qaeda in Iraq bombed an important Shiite mosque in February.

We think that the United States should spend less time arguing about whether or not this fighting constitutes a civil war, and more time working on ending the violence. Al Qaeda certainly wants a civil war. Iran would probably like a civil war. The United States should be working much harder at ending the sectarian violence.

This will not be easy.

A big part of the problem is the various sectarian militias. Ideally, all should be disarmed, but as with so many other things, that's easier said than done. One serious impediment is the fact that some of the militias have ties to some key members of the Iraqi government.

Further, several of the militias seem to have penetrated the Iraqi security forces. The Iraqi police in particular seem to have been infiltrated by Muqtada al Sadr's Mahdi Army. As one might expect, the Sunnis now have no faith in the police.

2.2: Conclusions

Our conclusions on Iraq have not changed substantially in the last year.

  1. Whether one agreed with the invasion of Iraq or not, we are there now, and we can't afford to fail. We do not need an "exit strategy" for Iraq, we need a plan for victory. We should define "victory" as a stable, democratic Iraq. The United States should encourage a new democratic government in Iraq. The election of a transitional government in January 2005 was a step in the right direction. The constitutional referendum in September 2006 is another good step towards Iraqi self-rule. We are nonetheless obliged to keep US military forces in Iraq until the nation is stabilized, and democracy is established.

  2. The consequences of losing in Iraq would be catastrophic. Al Qaeda routinely points out in its propaganda that the US can be defeated, and cites Viet Nam, Lebanon, and Somalia as examples. We cannot afford to give them a victory in Iraq. If that were not bad enough, consider the implications of allowing terrorists such as al Qaeda in Iraq, or militia leaders like Muqtada al Sadr, to gain control of Iraq's oil wealth. Either one would be extremely hostile to the United States.

    The benefits of success in Iraq are potentially large. One of the root causes of radical Islamic terrorism is that few Arabs have any real voice in their governments. Building Iraq into a functioning democracy directly attacks this root cause of terrorism. We would note that US action in Iraq has already encouraged some positive developments in Lebanon and Libya.

    As painful as it might be to continue operations in Iraq, it is our "least bad" option.

  3. While the US is now irrevocably committed to the war in Iraq, we always questioned whether Iraq represented an imminent threat. Al Qaeda has demonstrated that it is an immediate threat, and we still think that Osama bin Ladin and his followers should have been the first priority of our military and intelligence efforts. While Saddam Hussein unquestionably supported some other terrorist organizations, (typically, the "traditional" secular Palestinian terrorist groups) there is still little evidence of cooperation between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Ladin's al Qaeda network. It is also now clear that Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction were not an immediate threat, though they were a long term threat.


3: Election Year Silliness

Since 2006 is a Congressional election year, we're forced to comment on the various parties positions on the War on Terror. We have seen absolutely no evidence that the parties have the slightest clue as to what to do. We will therefore not endorse either party.

The Republicans: More of the Same

If you like the way the war on terror is being run now, then you can vote Republican. We won't.

The Democrats: Run Away!

The Democrat's position on almost everything seems to be: "We don't really have a plan, but we REALLY hate Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld". To our minds, this solves nothing. We have seen no evidence that the Democrats have any plan for defeating al Qaeda, or doing anything in Iraq except running away. Past experience suggests that the Democrats will further cut the military. We can be absolutely certain that these policies will have disastrous consequences.

The Democrats' position reminds us of Sir Robin's line from Monty Python and the Holy Grail: "Maybe it would help confuse it if we ran away more."

Sorry, it won't be voting for them either..

Is there anybody else up there?

We seem to be faced with a Hobson's choice: We can either vote for a party that understands that we need to win the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan but has no idea how to do it, or we can vote for a party that doesn't understand that we need to win. What we need are candidates who understand that we need to win, and have a realistic plan for winning.

Any volunteers?


More election year nonsense

Dubai Ports World

Remember the Dubai Ports World fiasco that popped up last March? It's back.

In case you missed it, a British owned company that operates shipping terminals in many US ports was sold to a company based in Dubai. This triggered a political firestorm that was remarkable for its total lack of basis in fact. Critics of the sale (and there were many from both major political parties) wrongly suggested that the sale would somehow compromise port security. This completely ignores the fact that port security is controlled by the US Coast Guard and the US Customs Service, and not by shipping terminal operators. The critics also wrongly said that US ports were being sold, when in fact only the right to operate shipping terminals was being sold. But the critics, undeterred by the facts, pressured Dubai Ports World into promising to sell the US shipping terminal operations to a US company within 6 months. The effect on US security was at best zero, and it created tension with a moderate Arab country that has friendly relations with the US.

It's back because the sale of terminal operations probably will take longer than 6 months to complete. Pandering politicians will no doubt seek to use this non-issue to gain an advantage in the upcoming election. We have a pointy question for those pandering politicians: If Arab ownership of US shipping terminal operations is a security risk, isn't it also a security risk to allow China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) to operate US shipping terminals? COSCO is after all a wholly owned subsidiary of the People's Liberation Army Navy of the People's Republic of China, which is clearly an arm of the Chinese government. A list of US ports with COSCO-operated terminals can be found on their web site <http://www.cosco-usa.com/services/cargo_rcvg.htm>. Note that the former Long Beach naval base is on the list, despite a 1998 act of Congress prohibiting this.

Valerie Plame redux

Back in February 2004 we said:

" ... whoever leaked the fact that Wilson's wife [Plame] is a CIA agent should be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law, even if that person is named Karl Rove."

On September 7th Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage publicly announced that he was the source of the leak. He went on to say that independent counsel Patrick Fitzgerald has known since 2003 that he was the source of the leak, but swore him to secrecy. Fitzgerald then continued to investigate the leak, and continues to investigate it today. Fitzgerald was hired specifically to discover who revealed that Plame was a CIA agent. Once he found the culprit, was it really necessary to investigate for another three years? And why did he swear Armitage to secrecy? Something very strange is going on here.

4: Other national security problems


The Recent Lebanese Crisis
Iran, again
North Korea, again
Torture, again
Military Tribunals
Domestic surveillance
Military Transformation

4.1: The Recent Lebanese Crisis

4.1.1 Who are the good guys?

Unfortunately, the answer to this question seems to be "nobody"

Hezbollah

Hezbollah is unquestionably a terrorist organization, and it is unquestionably hostile to the United States. Hezbollah also unquestionably started this latest mid-east war by invading Israel, and capturing two soldiers. We have no sympathy at all for Hezbollah. They are clearly among the "bad guys". In a simpler world, we would just regard Hezbollah as a target, and be done with them.

Unfortunately, like most things in the Middle East, it's not that simple.

Before the latest conflict, Hezbollah was supported primarily by Lebanon's Shia Muslim community, the former Syrian occupiers, and Iran. However, by successfully(?) attacking Israel, they are now considered heroes by many Lebanese (and many others in the Arab world) who would never have supported them otherwise.

Iran

Hezbollah is essentially an Iranian proxy. Note that Hezbollah attacked Israel just as the UN Security Council was taking up Iran's decidedly less than positive response to the European Union's proposal on Iran's nuclear program. The timing was of course purely coincidental.

Thus, we would certainly number Iran as among "the bad guys" For more on why Iran is a dangerous enemy of the United States, see Section 4.2, below.

Israel

Um.... guys, what are you trying to do here???

Israel has long been an ally of the United States, but their actions in this latest instance have been highly questionable. Since US policy these past many decades has been to support Israel unconditionally, anything bad that they do gets blamed on the United States. Many presume, rightly or wrongly, that they have at least our permission, or are acting on our orders. The latter assumption ignores the fact that Israel has on many occasions acted against the interests of the United States.

4.1.2 Hitting the Wrong Targets

There have been many well-documented incidents of Israel bombing UN troops, ambulances, civilian targets. We have to wonder what are they really trying to accomplish. Their approach has even hurt their own cause.

To top it all off, Israel's attack wasn't even very effective at stopping Hezbollah's rocket attacks.

So, if Israel's actions were so often contrary to their stated goals, either they have different, unstated goals, or they're spectacularly incompetent. Either way, it's not good for the United States.

Lots of civilian casualties. An unknown (but apparently fairly small) Hezbollah casualties. What were they thinking?

4.1.3 The Failure of Strategic Bombing Theory..... Again

You can't bomb a population into submission. Non-military prime minister Olmert doesn't seem to understand this. It didn't work in World War I. It didn't work in World War II. It didn't work in Vietnam. It didn't work in Lebanon.

4.2: Iran: Things go from bad to worse, and then the cycle repeats.

In years past, we had expressed cautious optimism about Iran's future. Iran actually had more democratic institutions than most states in the region, and Iranian voters had regularly elected moderate, reform-minded politicians.

Last year, we reported that Iran had taken several large steps backwards.

In 2006, things have gotten still worse.

In 2005, Iran had an "election" for a new president. It was effectively rigged by the unelected, hard-line Council of Guardians. The Council removed all of the true reformers from the ballot, leaving only the discredited former president Rafsanjani (who was not really a reformer anyway) to run against their preferred candidate, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. As one might have expected, the Council's preferred candidate won.

We predicted only bad things from the President Ahmadinejad, and so far, our fears have been confirmed

An Iranian nuclear weapons program presents problems similar to the North Korean nuclear weapons program. Iran's hard-line rulers already support some terrorist organizations, so there would be a risk of a nuclear weapon falling into the hands of terrorists. Iranian hard-liners might under some circumstances even be tempted to use a nuclear weapon themselves. There is also the frightening prospect that deterrence may not work against Iran's hard line rulers. For example an Iranian attempt to destroy Israel would be suicidal, since Israel almost certainly already has the capacity to deliver a devastating retaliatory strike; but Iran's president called for the destruction of Israel anyway.

On the surface Iran's nuclear weapons program and support for Iraqi insurgents appear to be contrary to Iran's own national interest. The weapons program may yet lead to Iran's economic isolation, and would be of little military value in a confrontation with either Israel or the west. Iraq's Sunni insurgents are in general extremely hostile to Iran's Shi'ia government, and have killed many Iraqi Shi'ia. In the September 2005 issue of U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings respected defense analyst Norman Friedman suggests that Iran's apparently counterproductive behavior has more to do with keeping Iran's increasingly unpopular rulers in power than with furthering the interests of Iran's people. The rise of a truly democratic Iraq, for example, might lead the Iranian people to demand real democratic reforms.

4.2.1 No Good Military Options

As in North Korea the US has no good military options, though for somewhat different reasons. Attacking the uranium production facilities risks causing widespread radioactive contamination. Any attack would likely enrage the Iranian public at large - people who for the most part would otherwise favor better relations with the United States.

We must also note that given the recent US intelligence problems any preemptive strike against Iran is highly questionable. Iran has gone to great lengths to hide its nuclear facilities, and a preemptive strike would require accurate intelligence. Further, the US military is still bogged down in Iraq, and there are few forces to spare for any putative operations against Iran. We do not advocate any military strike against Iran at this point.

4.2.2 Few Good Diplomatic Options

Hopes for diplomacy in Iran have diminished. While the United Nations initially showed some uncharacteristic firmness in its diplomatic efforts to stop Iran's uranium enrichment program, they have been largely unsuccessful. The IAEA has referred the matter to the Security Council, but the warnings to Iran have been watered down under pressure from Russia and China. Russia has been assisting Iran's nuclear program in exchange for much needed hard cash, and China is increasingly dependent on Iran's oil. Iran is also a major customer of China's arms industry. This virtually guarantees that future UN resolutions will amount to nothing more than "Stop, or we'll say stop again!"

We had been willing to give the European and UN efforts to contain Iran's nuclear program a chance to work, but these efforts seem have hit a dead end. We can only hope that the international community will develop a backbone, and start diplomatically and economically isolating Iran. We have little expectation that this will happen. Even if it does happen, if Iran's leaders are concerned only with maintaining their power they may not care about the consequences for their own people. Economic sanctions against Iran may be as ineffective as they were against Saddam Hussein.

4.2.3 A New Cold War?

It is more realistic to expect a sort of "cold war" with Iran. We have an enemy who will not negotiate with us. The failure of the most recent round of negotiations with the UK, France and Germany should demonstrate to them what the US learned the hard way on November 4, 1979: we cannot deal with Iran diplomatically. We cannot negotiate our way to a mutual understanding. We have no viable military option. There is the potential for a nuclear standoff. There are good historical parallels to the Cold War with the Soviet Union (1946-1991). The United States and her allies should use cold war style economic and diplomatic efforts against Iran. This will not be easy. We should not expect quick results. The original Cold War took 45 years to win.

The "cold war" scenario assumes that Iran can be deterred from using nuclear weapons. There is a very real possibility that a nuclear armed Iran might be tempted to transfer weapons to a terrorist organization who would use them, while Iran could deny any responsibility. As we noted above there is also a terrifying possibility that Iran's radical government might use nuclear weapons against Israel for religious reasons, regardless of the consequences.


4.3: North Korea: Things go from bad to worse, and then the cycle repeats.

The North Korean problem has gotten worse, again. On 9 October, 2006, North Korea detonated a nuclear weapon. This confirmed our worst fear, that North Korea is now a nuclear power.

While this is certainly alarming, it is hardly surprising. North Korea has been consistently working on a nuclear weapons program for decades, despite promises and treaty obligations.

While this is indeed bad, there are some valid reasons not to panic yet.

We've said previously all our options are bad.

The least bad option is still to continue with the current multilateral negotiations, even though progress has been agonizingly slow. The process has produced some minimal results, and still continues.

The multilateral negotiations have produced an "agreement in principle" that North Korea will abandon its nuclear weapons. On the one hand, this promise is better than nothing. On the other hand, a promise from an unstable dictator like Kim Jong Il is of questionable value. In characteristic fashion, after the last round of negotiations were completed, Kim Jong Il added a new condition: that the other powers supply him with light water reactors for power generation.

Since there are few, if any, other options available to us (we have noted in the past that military options are especially impractical) we continue to advocate negotiations. We continue to have low expectations. The only glimmer of hope is that in the wake of North Korea's nuclear test the Russians and Chinese finally voted for a UN Security Council resolution that included limited sanctions against North Korea. However the sanctions still must be implemented, and the implementation process will provide ample opportunity for Russia and/or China to again thwart any meaningful action.

The United States has very little leverage with North Korea. We have no formal diplomatic relations with them. There is no trade between the US and North Korea. China is North Korea's main political ally, financial backer, and main supplier of food and energy. Thus, China is really the only country that can wield an effective "stick" against North Korea.

We are not pleased by the fact that US policy has effectively been placed into the hands of Beijing, which has frequently shown itself to be hostile. Our only hope in this case is that China is actually upset about the nuclear test. We can only observe their reaction.

4.4: The Use of Torture and other "Extreme" Forms of Interrogation

In our previous message, we condemned the use of torture by the military. We were pleased to see that Sen. McCain's amendment passed and was signed into law. The topic has come up again, as part of the debate over the CIA's interrogation of prisoners.

This should be so obvious that we shouldn't need to say it.

We condemn the use of torture in all cases. In addition to being immoral and illegal (explicitly forbidden by the Geneva Convention, to which the US is a party), it is ineffective. Prisoners being tortured will say almost anything, true or false, to get the torture to stop.

If the United States wishes to be seen by the world as the "Good Guys", we must behave accordingly. The abuse of Iraqi prisoners has significantly hurt the US cause in Iraq, by making us appear to be the villains. The terrorists have used our abuse of prisoners as a recruiting tool.

While the terrorists have certainly given their prisoners even worse treatment, we have to be much better than they are. We're supposed to be the "good guys", and our treatment of prisoners must be clearly better than theirs.

We support the efforts of numerous US senators, notably Senators McCain (who was tortured by the North Vietnamese during his captivity in the infamous "Hanoi Hilton"), Warner, and Graham, to explicitly forbid the CIA from using torture. This should not be controversial. We note that former Secretary of State Colin Powell, (a former general, and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and numerous other military people have also supported this effort. We are dismayed that it has become necessary for them to take this action.

We should also note that President Bush has taken his equivocation on this issue to Clintonian levels. He keeps telling us that his administration does not use torture, but then equivocates on what torture is. We half expected him to say that it depends on what the meaning of the word "is" is. Needless to say, we are not pleased by this. We were happier to note that the bill advocated by Senators Warner, McCain and Graham spelled out exactly which forms of torture were forbidden.

4.5: Military Tribunals

Military tribunals are the only option for bringing Al Qaeda terrorists captured abroad to trial. They are completely legal under international law.

But the devil is in the details. President Bush has some details wrong; Senators McCain, Warner, Graham, et al. have them right. We can't set aside key legal principles that safeguard our freedom just because they're inconvenient. We support their efforts to prohibit the use of secret evidence. One day we may pay a high price for standing on our principles, but if we don't then what are we fighting for? We're the Good Guys, and we have to hold ourselves to a higher standard.

What's right with military tribunals? The people we want to put on trial are foreign nationals who were captured outside the USA, and in at least some cases the crimes were committed outside outside the USA. The jurisdiction of the US domestic legal system is questionable. Military tribunals derive at least part of their authority from international law, so their jurisdiction is not in question.

The people who support the McCain approach can hardly be accused of being a bunch of bleeding heart liberals. Quite a few of them have extensive military backgrounds. Some key supporters within Congress:

We unconditionally support Senators McCain, Warner and Graham on this issue.

4.6: Domestic surveillance

Earlier this year two domestic intelligence gathering programs have come to light. One tapped international telephone calls between suspected al Qaeda members in the USA and those overseas; the second examined the telephone billing records of millions of US residents. Both programs were conducted by the National Security Agency (NSA).

4.6.1: Warrantless Wiretapping

In the case of the warrantless wiretapping program we believe the Bush Administration clearly overstepped its authority.

There is a perfectly adequate system for court oversight of domestic wiretaps for foreign intelligence gathering purposes: The FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) Courts, which almost never turn down wiretap requests. FISA courts can even grant retroactive warrants, so in urgent cases the executive branch can tap first and get permission later. They are hardly an unreasonable burden to the Executive Branch of government.

The whole US system of government is designed on a system of "checks and balances" to keep any one branch from getting too strong. The FISA courts provide an important check on the power of the executive branch. In bypassing the FISA courts, the executive branch (i.e. the Bush administration) is trying to make itself too powerful.

As we've noted many times in the past part of the problem is that the US has not formally declared war against al Qaeda, Afghanistan, Iraq, or anyone else. When war is formally declared Congress effectively grants the president additional powers. But those powers go away at the end of the war. By claiming a war power during "peacetime", the Bush administration seem to be trying to make this a permanent power of the executive branch.

Curiously it is politically conservative Republicans in Congress who seem to best understand the danger in this. For example during a discussion on the PBS NewsHour, Senator Lindsey Graham said "All I can tell you is that the ultimate damage that I want to avoid is a constitutional damage in terms of checks and balances. I want to fight this enemy. I want to make sure our president and our military surveils the enemy. I want to know if American citizens are collaborating with the enemy. We can do that. We must do that. But the biggest thing that can happen, to me, as a nation is that in the process of fighting the enemy, we give up the processes that makes us free."

Conservatives who are not convinced by that argument should try this one:

Would you want a future President Hillary Clinton to have the power to wiretap at will?

We didn't think so.

4.6.2: Telephone Billing Records

The telephone billing records issue is somewhat murkier. As is often the case the devil is in the details, and we do not know all of the details.

Since one of the Wells Brothers has an affiliation with the telecommunications industry, and even occasionally worked on billing records, some things are clear: Billing records tell almost nothing about the content of the call. They can tell who you called, when you called, and for how long. This does start to get into privacy issues.

Proponents of the program argue that the records were voluntarily supplied by the various telephone companies; a 1979 Supreme Court decision explicitly stated that telephone billing records were not covered by 4th Amendment protections; and all personally identifiable information was stripped from the records before they were turned over to the government.

Critics of the program counter-argue that Congress extended 4th Amendment protections to telephone billing records after the 1979 Supreme Court decision; Congress also passed laws that prohibit telephone companies from divulging these records without a court order; and the records clearly contain telephone numbers, which are personally identifiable. Further, even without the congressional action cited above, the 4th Amendment was originally written to protect the "unreasonable search and seizure" of personal papers. Business records like telephone billing records are obviously a modern equivalent.

At the moment we know too little about this program to say with any certainty that one side or the other is correct. The statements of some proponents of the program raise our suspicions, though. As the critics note the argument that the records were purged of personally identifiable information is clearly incorrect. To be of any use the records must contain telephone numbers, and as anyone who has used an Internet telephone directory knows it is frighteningly easy to match an individual to a phone number. Proponents are also too quick to argue that even discussing the program's legality will somehow help al Qaeda. Osama bin Laden and his minions would be unbelievably stupid if they did not already think the US is trying very, very hard to track their communications. The size of the program also raises our suspicions. According to some reports it may involve records from up to 225 million telephones. It seems improbable that al Qaeda would have so many sympathizers in the USA.

Proponents of both programs also argue that the 9/11 attacks demonstrated a need to gather more intelligence. The 9/11 Commission Report presents a somewhat different view. It makes few recommendations about gathering more intelligence; it makes numerous recommendations to improve the analysis and distribution of the intelligence that was already being gathered. If as the 9/11 Commission said the intelligence problems were mainly in analysis and distribution, gathering additional intelligence won't help much until these problems are corrected. It may actually make matters worse by flooding already overburdened analysts with even more data.

4.7: Military transformation: How's that working for you?

In several previous messages we've expressed skepticism towards Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's "military transformation". After nearly six years, we still have no idea what the military is being transformed into, or why it needed transforming in the first place. The only apparent changes are
  1. the defense budget has increased substantially
  2. the size of our military continues to shrink.
This might be acceptable if it produced good results. It hasn't. So far it has demonstrated an ability to topple hostile governments, but no ability to win the subsequent peace. The failure to "win the peace" in Iraq is so glaringly apparent that it barely needs to be mentioned. And in Afghanistan - once held up as a model of the effectiveness of a "transformed" military - the Taliban are resurgent in the south, while other parts of the country have fallen under the control of opium growers. If this is "success", we'd really hate to see failure.

It is now obvious that the small "transformed" forces used to overthrow the Taliban and Saddam Hussein were far too small to pacify the countries afterward. This was entirely foreseeable, and was in fact foreseen by the Army prior to the Iraq war. Gen. Eric Shinseki recommended using nearly three times the 130,000 troops that were actually sent, but the recommendation fell on deaf ears.

  Unfortunately Secretary Rumsfeld seems unwilling to abandon "military transformation" in favor of methods that have been proven to work in the past. We therefore believe he should be replaced by someone who will fight the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq more effectively.


5: Links:


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